The Cy Pres Doctrine in Kentucky by Covington, John Coleman
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 1 Article 8
1946
The Cy Pres Doctrine in Kentucky
John Coleman Covington
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Covington, John Coleman (1946) "The Cy Pres Doctrine in Kentucky," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 35 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol35/iss1/8
THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY
Courts look with favor on donations to charitable trusts and
liberally construe such gifts. Often a settlor leaves his property in
trust to charities but for some reason it is impossible or impractical
to carry out his particular purpose. In such a case the court will not
allow the gift to fail unless the trust provides for a gift over, or is
specifically restricted to the named purpose. The courts base their
decision on the theory that the settlor had a general charitable in-
tention, in addition to his particular intention, and give effect to the
general intention by applying the gift to a purpose as near the par-
ticular purpose as is practicable. This principle is called the doc-
trine of cy pres1 Of course, if the language of the donor expressly
indicates or is construed to indicate that he wants to carry out the
named purpose and no other, then cy pres will not be applied.!
Historically, in England,' the sole requirement for a valid gift
was that the donor show a general charitable purpose. If such a
general purpose was indicated, the king, as parens patriae, by the
exercise of his prerogative, would designate the specific purpose to
which the gift would be made. Such gifts did not fail for the reason
that no particular purpose or method of applying the gift was named;
that a person appointed to select the purpose failed to exercise his
power; or that the donor himself had reserved the right to designate
the charity and had failed to exercise it. In such a case, the chan-
cellor, acting for the king as the king's minister under the sign
manual and not as a court of equity, would designate the particular
purpose.' This purpose under the prerogative cy pres need not be
similar to the donor's purpose. Where, however, the beneficiaries of
the trust had been designated, in general or collective terms, as the
poor in a given county or parish, or when a person had been ap-
pointed to select the described portion or kind or number from a
designated class, the chancellor, acting as a judicial officer in a
court of equity, would sustain the gift as a charitable trust'
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky rejected the English preroga-
tive doctrine of cy pres as early as 1836.8 Language may also be
found in some cases leading to the inference that judicial cy pres
is also rejected and there has probably been a common impression
among lawyers to that effect. It is so stated in Bogert on Trusts.'
Bogert bases his conclusion on the decision in Cromie's Heirs v.
13 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 399.
'Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 86 N. E. 351 (1908).
'2 BOGERT, TRUSTS (1935) secs. 431, 432; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939)
secs. 399, 399.1.
'Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 229, 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (1754).
'See Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 354
(1836).
" Id. at 366.
'2 BOGERT, TRUSTS (1935) sec. 433.
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Louisville Orphan's Home' where the Kentucky Court refused to ap-
ply a surplus of a trust fund cy pres. It was held there that the
surplus should revert-to the donor's estate, since the charity desig-
nated was a New York charity, limited in the amount of property,
real and personal, which it could hold, with all assets over that legal
limit becoming the property of the state. This same case, however,
quotes with approval from an early Kentucky case:' "And we are
satisfied that the cy pres doctrine is not and should not be a judicial
doctrine, except in one kind of case-where there is an available ob-
ject, and a particular mode, inadequate, illegal, or inappropriate,
or which happens to fail, has been prescribed."1 It is further stated
in the Cromie Case.' referring to the repeal of the English statute of
charitable uses, which had been adopted by Kentucky as a part of its
common law, that "the only object of the repeal of the British statute,
in some respects more local and consistent with British policy, was
to substitute a system more congenial with our institutions, and by
a legislative indorsement of the doctrine suggested in Moore v. Moore
... to eliminate the cy pres doctrine of England. Consequently
American charity, properly defined, and judicially upheld and ap-
plied, is still a favored nurseling in Kentucky." The present Ken-
tucky statute provides that any gift made "for any charitable or
human purpose shall be valid if it points out with reasonable cer-
tainty the purposes of the charity and the beneficiaries thereof."'
Considering this, can it be said that Kentucky does not apply at least
to a limited extent the doctrine of judicial cy pres?
Generally judicial cy pres is applicable in two situations: (a)
where the testator indicates a general charitable purpose but fails
to designate a specific charitable object; and (b) where the indicated
purpose is reasonably specific, but this specific purpose cannot be
carried out under the circumstances. Examples of (a) are gifts
"to charity" or "to charitable objects." These are classed as "gen-
eral" since no mention is made of any one of the four principal di-
visions which are, in the legal sense, included in the word "charity:"
namely, trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement
of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for
other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any
of the preceding heads." Under the English doctrine and under the
doctrine as applied by many of the states in this country, the general
charitable intent is sufficient and the courts will apply the gift
8 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 365, 375 (1867).
'Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 354 (1836).
"66 Ky. (3 Bush) 365 (1867).
Id. at 375.
"Ky. R. S. 381.260.
"See Commissioners For Special Purposes of Income Tax v.
Pemsel, (1891) A. C. 531, 538.
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cy pres.' Any one of a number of circumstances may require the
application of (b), some being where conditions which existed at
the time the testator executed his will have changed and the funds
are not sufficient to meet the financial needs of the charity; or where
the specific charity designated to receive the funds or property has
ceased to exist; or where specific realty is given to the charity to be
used in a designated way only and it becomes impracticable or im-
possible to continue to use it in that way. In disposing of property
of this class, judicial cy pres will find some purpose similar to the
original purpose and apply it in that manner.
To what extent will Kentucky apply judicial cy pres, as in (a),
above, where only a general charitable purpose is evidenced? Ap-
parently in such a situation Kentucky will not apply the cy pres
doctrine and the gift will fail since a general charitable purpose
alone does not meet the requirement of definiteness. Thus a gift to
charitable institutions where the donees are to be designated accord-
ing to the trustee's judgment will fail.V ' Also declared to be invalid
was a devise as follows: "everything else I own goes to charity. I
leave that to my brother Sam to give out,"' since the power granted
to the brother cannot be carried out. In another case, ' the testator,
after making certain specific gifts to charity, directed that his execu-
tor should dispose of the residue of his estate "according to his judg-
ment for good and charitable purposes." The Court, in holding the
gift invalid, said: '"No peculiar or particular person, or class of per-
sons, is pointed out as the recipient." A devise "for charitable ob-
jects to be expended in this Diocese of Louisville, according to his
(the executor's) discretion" was void because of uncertainty, the
court stating that such a provision amounted "to nothing more than
a power of attorney to make a will for the testator."' From the
decisions in the above cases, it is evident that in order to be upheld
as a charitable gift in Kentucky, the testator must state something
more than a general charitable purpose, since the court will not
invoke judicial cy pres in aid of such a gift, and the power granted
to an executor to select the charity is void.
Instances of charitable trusts which the Kentucky Court has
found to meet the requirement of definiteness of purpose and bene-
ficiaries are numerous. In all of these, in addition to showing a
general intent, the testator has narrowed his object, at least to the
extent of specifying one of the principal divisions of charitable
"4Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839 (1888); In re
Jordon's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 Atl. 150 (1938); Anonymous, 2
Freem. Ch. 261, 22 Eng. Rep. 1197 (1702).
1 Gooding et al. v. Watson's Trustee, 235 Ky. 562, 31 S.W. 2d 919
(1930).
'5Simmon's Ex'r. et al. v. Hunt et al., 171 Ky. 397, 188 S. W. 495
(1916).
" Gerick's Ex'r. v. Gerick, 158 Ky. 478, 165 S.W. 695 (1914).
" Spalding et al. v. St. Joseph's School for Boys of the City of
Louisville, 107 Ky. 382, 441, 54 S.W. 200 (1899).
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purposes. Thus a gift to an orphan's home was applied cyj pres for
the State Welfare Department at the outset, the home in its corpor-
ate entity having ceased to exist before the testator's death and the
administration of the home having been taken over and continued
by the Welfare Department." A gift in trust "to assist aged un-
married women, preferably teachers" was sufficiently definite," as
was a devise to the testator's executor to be distributed "to the poor
in his discretion."' Further, a gift "to such charitable institutions
as may appear most useful in disseminating the Gospel at home and
abroad," with discretionary power in the trustees as to the particular
object and method, was sufficiently definite," while a gift to the use
of "a public seminary" has been applied to a seminary in the same
county, even though the latter was not in existence at the time of the
testator's death, nor was the fund sufficient to establish such a sem-
inary.' Finally a gift for the purpose of educating poor orphans of
the county was valid.? In view of these decisions, it can apparently
be said that judicial cy pres, as in (b), is applied in Kentucky, and it
would appear that when the Court is applying the statute, that it is
in substance applying judicial cy pres.
Kentucky has applied judicial cy pres without exception where
the charitable trust was valid at the outset, but because of changed
conditions and circumstances the original charitable purpose has
subsequently failed. The courts are assisted in these cases by a
statute" which grants a court of equity the power to order the sale of
property held in trust for a charity and its reinvestment
for the same general purposes. In one instance, where
the trust income subsequently became insufficient for the
continued operation of a school for needy girls, the court
directed that a plan be formulated for the application of the
trust funds, after the sale of the land, to the same general
purpose' In another case, funds given originally for the mainte-
nance of scholarships in a designated school were permitted to be
used for scholarships in a school of the same religious faith in
another county. ' In still another instance, trustees were authorized
to sell land held in trust for school purposes and the proceeds trans-
'Kentucky Children's Home, Lyndon v. Woods, 289 Ky. 20, 157
S.W. 2d 473 (1941).
2OState Bank & Trust Co. v. Patridge, 198 Ky. 403, 248 S.W.
1056 (1923).
'Thompson's Ex'r. v. Brown, 116 Ky. 102, 75 S.W. 210 (1903).
1 Attorney General v. Wallace's Devisees, 46 Ky. (7 B. Monroe)
611 (1847).
Curling's Adm'r. v. Curling's Heirs, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 38 (1839).
Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 354 (1836).
"Ky. R. S. 381.260.
KY. R. S. 273.140.
Pennebaker v. Pennebaker Home for Girls, 297 Ky. 670, 181
S.W. 2d 49 (1944).
' Scott-Lees Collegiate Institute v. Charles et al., 283 Ky. 234,
140 S.W. 2d 1060 (1940).
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ferred to a city school board to be used in the construction of a
school building, the land having become unsuited for school pur-
poses." And again, where local prejudice prevented the successful
continuance of a school for negroes, the court consented to the sale
and application of the trust funds for the same purpose in a more
favorable location.
In Kentucky, as in other jurisdictions, cy pres will not be applied
when the testator's purpose is absolutely definite as to the benefi-
ciary and this definite purpose cannot be accomplished. This may
account for the failure of the trust in Brewer v. Baxter's Ex'r. ' In
that case the income was to be paid by the trustees "to the governing
authorities" of the Church of Christ. No such central governing
authority existed in that church although there were numerous in-
dividual churches of the same name and faith in Kentucky. In de-
claring the gift void, the court said that although it would apply
gifts cy pres to kindred objects when such objects exist, that in the
instant case no such kindred object existed or was available, and that
the court itself could not supply an object for the trust. In so holding
the court must have decided that some central governing authority
was the intended object of the trust and not the advancement of the
particular religion or else that the trust failed for indefiniteness.
This decision points to the fact that if the donor desires to establish
a trust for the advancement of a particular religious denomination
and the particular unit to which the funds are to be paid fails, there
must exist some central organization capable of receiving the funds
and of carrying out the object.
In conclusion, it can be said with reference to the application of
cy pres in Kentucky that: (1) where the donor indicates a general
charitable purpose only, that the gift will not be applied cy pres and
the gift will fail; (2) where the donor indicates in addition to his
general charitable purpose a particular purpose, judicial cy pres will
be applied and the gift will not fail; (3) where once a charitable
trust has been established and its purpose subsequently fails, Ken-
tucky without exception will apply the fund cy pres; (4) where the,
donor indicates an absolutely definite purpose and none other, Ken-
tucky will not apply the doctrine of cy pres and the gift will fail.
JOHN COLEMAN COVINGTON
" Board of Trustees of Madison Academy v. Board of Education
of the City of Richmond, 282 Ky. 671, 139 S.W. 2d 766 (1940).
Hill v. McGarvey, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 101, 19 S.W. 56 (1892).
'1295 Ky. 416, 174 S.W. 2d 698 (1943).
